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Abstract
Prior work suggests coordination failure between the labour and education markets leads
some workers to have educational qualifications in excess of those specified by the firm
(overeducation) and others to have less (undereducation).  This paper theoretically models
and empirically tests the hypothesis that overeducation and undereducation arise out of a
common equilibrium matching process that maximises net benefits to workers and firms
over the life of the match. The theoretical model predicts that the overeducated begin in
low-paying, entry-level jobs early in their career that train them for higher-paying future
positions that require their educational background, whereas the undereducated start in
low-paying, exactly-educated jobs that can signal the worker has the necessary skills for
promotion.  This result suggests that prior comparisons of overeducated, undereducated,
and exactly-educated workers in a cross-section or short panel may be misleading because
all workers are exactly-educated during some portion of their career.  However, the
theoretical model predicts that the type of education match can be identified in a cross
section by differences between predicted and observed qualifications of the worker and
predicted and observed requirements of the firm. This hypothesis is tested using data on
British, working-age males to identify overeducated and undereducated workers and
confirm that these workers trade off a lower return to education for training and a
promotion return. 
JEL Classification: J24, J31
Key Words: Over and Undereducation
1I. Introduction
There has been much recent concern by researchers and policy makers over the apparent
lack of coordination between the labour market and the educational system.  A number of studies
have found that the education level of many workers either exceeds or falls short of that required
by their employer as “necessary to perform the job” and that their return to education differ
significantly from those whose qualifications match employer requirements (e.g., Hersch,1991;
Groot and Oosterbeck, 1994).  This paper develops and empirically tests a hedonic matching
model of the qualifications required by the firm and those actually held by the worker, which
shows that the matching process can naturally lead some workers to have more education than is
required (overeducation) early in a career and others to have less education than the stated
requirements (undereducation) later in a career.   
A significant portion of the workforce in industrialised countries can be classified as either
overeducated or undereducated.  For example, Sicherman (1991) compares the years of education
reported by workers as required for the job in the 1976 and 1978 waves of the PSID with their
actual years of education.  He finds that 40 percent of workers have more education than is
required for the job, whereas 16 percent have fewer years of education than required.   The
percentage of workers classified as overeducated or undereducated in Europe, while smaller than
in the U.S., ranges from 30 to 40 percent (e.g., Alba-Ramirez, 1993).  Thus, the phenomena of
overeducation/undereducation is pervasive in the labour markets of industrialised countries.
Two rationales for overeducation or undereducation have been examined.  First, a large
empirical literature treats both overeducation and undereducation as evidence of inefficiency in
the labour market and/or the education system.  For example, Rumberger (1981; 1987) argues
2that the overeducated are underutilised workers, whereas Duncan and Hoffman (1981) contend
that both overeducation and undereducation represent a short-run coordination failure between
firms and workers who eventually adjust their education requirements and investments to changes
in the supply and demand for human capital.  These and other studies test this mismatch
hypothesis by estimating wage regressions that include years of required education and measures
of whether the worker has more or less education than required (e.g., Cohn and Kahn; 1995). 
The results indicate that workers in a “good match”, where their qualifications equal firm
requirements, earn a higher return to education than those who appear to be mismatched. 
Second, several papers model overeducation as a result of career mobility.  For example,
Sicherman and Galor (1990) develop a theoretical model in which workers start in jobs for which
they are overeducated in exchange for a higher probability of moving up the job hierarchy.  They
test this hypothesis using data for working-age males from the 1976-81 waves of the PSID and
find that the correlation between the effect of education on wages and its effect on the probability
of moving to a “better” job is negative and significant.  This result suggests that overeducated
workers trade off a lower return to education for an increased probability of promotion.  
Our paper takes the first holistic approach to career mobility by theoretically modelling
and empirically testing the hypothesis that overeducation and undereducation arise out of a
common equilibrium matching process whereby workers and firms each maximise net benefits
over the life of the match.  The theoretical model predicts that the overeducated begin in low-
paying, entry-level jobs early in their career that train them for higher-paying future positions,
which require their educational background.  At the same time, the undereducated start in low-
paying jobs for which they are exactly educated and that provide an opportunity to signal that
3they have the necessary skills for promotion.  These results suggest that prior work that identifies
and compares the economic aspects of overeducation or undereducation relative to that of the
exactly educated in a cross-section or a short panel may be misleading, because all workers are
likely to be exactly-educated during some portion of their career.  
Data for working-age males from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative survey
(SCELI) are used to test and confirm the predictions of the discrete-hedonic-matching model.  In
particular, the model shows how the type of educational match can be identified by differences
between the predicted and observed education qualification of the worker and the predicted and
observed education requirement of the firm.  Following the theoretical model, these differences
are used to identify the type of educational match in probit models for on-the-job training and
promotion and in several wage equations. The results show that traditional wage equations can, in
some circumstances, understate the return to education because workers in an overeducated- and
an undereducated-type match trade off a lower return to education for future wage gains due to
training and promotion.
II. Two Illustrations of Career Mobility
By definition, overeducation or undereducation occur when the observed educational
qualifications of the worker (Q) do not match the stated educational requirements for the job (R)
at a particular point in time.  However, a worker-firm match often occurs over multiple periods
and, thus, may reflect the objectives of the worker and firm over the life of the match and not just
for a single period.  We develop a simple two-period model that shows overeducation (i.e., Q>R)
and undereducation (i.e., R>Q) can result if some workers move up the job hierarchy with
4experience.  To lay a foundation for the model, it is useful to begin with two simple illustrations
where career mobility can yield an overeducated- or an undereducated-type of match. 
There are a number of practical examples of an overeducated-type match.  For example,
most U.K. police officers enter the force with secondary school qualifications, which qualifies
them to be a patrol officer (i.e., a bobby on the beat).  However, some people enter the police
force with a university degree.  These people generally begin their career as a patrol officer,
because this experience improves their subsequent performance when they are promoted into jobs
that require their qualifications, such as a detective.  Thus, university-educated patrol officers
accept jobs for which they are overeducated in exchange for training and a future promotion.  
Alternatively, whereas most detectives have a college degree, some patrol officers with
only secondary school qualifications are promoted to detective because their on-the-job
experience in the field signals that they have the necessary skills and personal attributes to be
successful detective.   These secondary-educated detectives may be viewed as undereducated
because their qualifications are below those of many detectives who have a university degree.  It
follows that the experience of these secondary-educated detectives substitute, in part, for the
signal provided by a university degree and permit them to move up the job hierarchy.
These simple examples illustrate two important points.  First, they suggest that standard
wage equations may confound the return to education and experience, because the level of
education can affect subsequent opportunities for promotion.  In fact, our theoretical model
predicts that the wage profile is steeper for workers in an overeducated- and undereducated-type
of match because workers trade off an initial return to education for a promotion return.  
5Second, the illustrations suggest that the pool of exactly-educated workers may include
workers who are exactly-educated throughout their career, previously overeducated workers who
have been promoted into exactly-educated jobs, and undereducated-type workers who have yet to
move up the job ladder.  Prior work on overeducation and undereducation has not distinguished
between these several groups of exactly-educated workers.  Moreover, the predicted transition
from or to exactly-educated jobs cannot be observed directly using existing data sources, which
are cross-sectional or include only short panels.  Our theoretical model suggests a possible means
of indirectly distinguishing the overeducated, undereducated, and exactly-educated-type of match
within a cross-section by comparing the discrete values of the educational qualifications and
requirements, Q and R, with their predicted continuous values.  
Workers and firms may select among several discrete values for Q and R because these
variables represent a bundle of skills that permit the holder to perform tasks that could not be
adequately done in the absence of any single component of the required educational background. 
In this case, a firm may willingly hire overeducated workers if their “excess” education improves
their productivity on current and/or future jobs.  This could occur because a marginal increase in
the education level is directly productivity enhancing or because a degree provides a signal of
desirable worker attributes that are difficult to observe at the time of hire.  Moreover, if a signal
can be obtained by other means such as time on the job, experienced workers may be promoted
into jobs for which they are “undereducated” if they have the necessary qualification to perform
the job.  Thus, the return to education may be higher at the discrete qualification levels. Our
analysis focuses on a secondary school qualification and university degree, which are the only
values of Q and R enumerated in our data and where prior work suggests there is a significant
6clustering of workers (Jaeger and Page, 1996).  For simplicity, the analysis first models how
workers choose their utility-maximising educational qualification and firms select the profit-
maximising educational requirement in isolation before considering the joint matching process.
III. Discrete-Choice Models of Actual and Required Qualifications
A. The Individual Qualification Choice
Human capital theory predicts that individuals choose their education level in order to
maximise utility, which depends on the rate of return to education.  To formalise this process, we
adopt a random utility approach where an individual i obtains a level of education,  , if theEi
*
utility from this choice exceeds that of its alternatives.  The actual level of education for person i,
, is unobserved and is modelled as a linear index function: Ei
*
(1)E Xi i i
* '= +a e
where  is a vector of parameters associated with personal, family-background, and labour¢a
market measures that determine the rate of return to education, and  is a normally( )Xi e i
distributed error term that measures individual-specific random variation in the education level.  In
other words, (1) indicates that workers choose  based on the rate of return to education,Ei
*
which depends on factors such as personal ability and attitudes towards work, family access to
financial and human capital, and differences in the job mix and job-market information of local
labour markets.
The optimal education level in (1) is continuous, but a qualification is obtained when a
worker’s education level meets or surpasses a discrete, externally-verifiable threshold.  For
example, in the United Kingdom, a individual must attend school from the age 5 until age 16. 
However, a student who completes 13 years of schooling can take exams that, if passed, yield a
7superior secondary qualification (i.e., an A level).  At the same time, students who have one year
of university have not crossed the threshold for a university degree and, thus, have a secondary
school qualification as their highest qualification.  
In our data the actual qualification levels are comprised of three ordered values, the
government minimum education level (Qi=0), at least one A-level or equivalent (Qi=1), and a
university degree (Qi=2).  Thus, following our subsequent empirical analysis, equation (1) can
then be expressed as:
            (2.1)Q if Xi i i= ¢ + £0 0a e
(2.2)Q if Xi A i i= ³ ¢ + >1 0m a e
          (2.3)Q if Xi i i A= ¢ + >2 a e m
Equations (2.1) through (2.3) form the basis of an ordered-probit model of qualification choice
for individual i.  Qi is the qualification level that results from the latent, utility-maximising
education level,. Ei
*
B. The Firm Requirement Choice
Following producer theory, we assume that a firm hires a workers with a given education
level in order maximise profits.  Like the individual model, the profit-maximising education level
for a workers ( ) is unobserved and is expressed as a linear index function:EK
*
(3)E Z uK k k
* '= +b
8where  is a vector of coefficients for a set of firm, job, and labour market characteristics, ,¢b Zk
that affect the return to a given education level, and  is a normally distributed error term thatuk
measures firm-specific random variation in the return.  In other words, (3) indicates that workers
with are hired based on their return to the firm, which depends on factors such as how firmEk
*
and job attributes affect the net return to education and how labour-market conditions affect the
cost of changing educational requirements.
Although the education level of a worker is continuous, a qualification requirement is the
smallest discrete qualification that is sufficient to properly perform the job.  For example, a firm
may require a university degree because a secondary school qualification does not provide the
necessary skills to perform the job properly.  On the other hand, while a university degree may be
sufficient, one year of college may be what is necessary to properly perform the job.  Thus, the
stated educational qualification may exceed what is necessary to properly perform the job.  
Our data, like that for individual qualifications, include three possible requirement levels.
Thus, the firm’s qualification choice can be represented as an ordered-probit model using (3):
          (4.1)R if Z uk k k= ¢ + £0 0b
(4.2)R if Z uk R k k= ³ ¢ + >1 0m b
       (4.3)R if Z uk k k R= ¢ + >2 b m
where  represents the discrete required qualification level that is necessary to properly performRk
the job, which must meet or exceed the latent, profit-maximising education level,.Ek
*
1For notational convenience, workers climb the job ladder only in their current firm. The
results do not change, however, if experience in the current firm improves the promotion
prospects in other firms. 
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III. The Q-R Matching Process
A. An Overeducated Versus and Exactly-Educated Match
In this section, we develop a simple hedonic matching model where the worker and firm
can match if they share a common utility-maximising and profit-maximising education level, E*.
Figure 1 illustrates a specific case where workers and firms have selected Q ndR at ei her the
government minimum, 0, or a secondary school qualification, 1.  
For simplicity, the analysis focuses on two firms, X and Y, that operate in a competitive
market and earn zero economic profit in each of two periods.  Jobs in each firm have upward-
sloping, zero-profit, iso-profit lines (ð) in the wage-education space.  The iso-profit lines are
upward sloping because revenue and costs are assumed to increase on the margin with E.  On the
other hand, the height of the iso-profit lines differs between jobs at a qualification level because
the worker has acquired the bundle of skills necessary to move up the job hierarchy.  Productivity
in Firm Y is assumed to be solely a function of education, whereas Firm X p ovides on-the-job
training in the first period in an entry-level job, which links productivity to both education and
experience.  In other words, we assume that workers in Firm X move up the job hierarchy in
period 2 with experience (e.g., ).   Following the discrete choice model, the iso-profitp pX X
1 2®
lines are also indexed by R=0 or R=1, which represent the minimum discrete qualification to
properly perform the job.1
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The analysis focuses on the utility-maximising match for two workers, A and B.  Fo
simplicity, Worker A is assumed to have an optimal education level equal to the governmentally
mandated minimum (i.e., QA=E
*=0), whereas Worker B has an optimal education level equal to a
secondary school qualifications (i.e, QB=E
*=1).  Consider the equilibrium in Figure 1. The
minimum education level permits Worker A t  match in the lower-rung job of Firm X that pays
W0.  Worker A is exactly educated because the minimum education level matches the education
requirements (i.e., QA=R=0).  
However, Worker B, who has an A-level, can match with Firm X or Y.  In Firm Y, Worker
B is exactly educated (i.e., QB=R=1) and earns W2 in both periods, because earnings do not
increase with experience.  In firm X, Worker B earns W1 in the entry-level job in the first period
and is overeducated because his or her A-level exceeds the minimum education level that is
necessary to perform the job (i.e., QB>R=0).  However, in period 2, Worker B is promoted into a
job for which the A-level is necessary (i.e, QB=R=1) and earns W3.  In equilibrium, the earnings in
X and Y must be the same in order for worker 2 to be indifferent between the two jobs. Thus, it
must be the case that W1+W3=2W2, abstracting from discounting and assuming the periods are of
the same length.  It follows that overeducation occurs early in a career. 
The wage predictions in Figure 1 match the wage findings of Sicherman (1991) for
overeducated workers in the PSID.  Specifically, Worker B is vereducated in period 1 in Firm X
(i.e., QB>R=0) and earns more than the exactly-educated Worker A  in the same job (i.e.,
QA=R=0), so that W1>W0.  At the same time, Worker B ea ns less in the first period working for
Firm X in the overeducated job than for the exactly-educated job in Firm Y (i.e., QB=R=1), so
that W1<W2.  The worker and firm match based on a common E
*.  However, overeducation can
11
occur in equilibrium, because workers place in entry-level jobs that prepare them for future jobs
that require their formal education and job-related experience.
The wage differential between Worker A and B, W3-W0, can be divided into two
components.  First, comparing an exactly-educated worker to an overeducated worker in the
same job (i.e., Worker A versus B on ), an overeducated worker has higher qualifications thanp X
1
would be predicted for a typical worker in a low R job, . Worker B earns a wageQ EB > 0
*
premium, W1-W0, for these excess qualifications.  
Second, comparing the same worker in an exactly-educated versus an overeducated match
(i.e., Worker B on versus ), the firm has lower requirements than would be predicted for ap X
1 p X
2
firm that hires workers with an A-level, .  Worker B earns a wage premium, W3-W1, forR E< 1
*
the promotion into a job with greater requirements.  Note, however, that Worker B could als
match with Firm Y that pays more in the first period but less in the second period than Firm X. 
Thus, Worker B trades off an initial low rate of return to human capital for a promotion return.  It
follows that an overeducated worker is more likely to have Q>E* rel tive to a comparably-placed,
exactly-educated worker and is more likely to work for a firm that has R<E* rel tive to a
comparably-educated, exactly-educated worker.
B. An Undereducated Versus an Exactly-Educated Match 
Figure 2 compares the wage-requirement relationship for undereducated and exactly-
educated workers using the notation in Figure 1.  Specifically, there are two competitive firms
that earn zero economic profit in each of two periods.  In Firm X, worker productivity depends on
both education and experience, whereas productivity depends solely on education in Firm Y.  In
this case, however, suppose that one year of university is the minimum education level necessary
2Similarly, Alba-Ramirez (1993) contends that educational mismatch can result from the
substitution of experience, tenure, or training for formal educational qualifications to obtain the
desired aggregate human capital bundle of a firm for its workers. He finds empirical evidence in
support of this ‘substitution hypothesis’ using cross-sectional Spanish labour market data, which
is replicated for the U.K. using the SCELI data by Sloane et al (1996).
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to properly perform job 2 for Firm X (i.e., =1.5).  It follows that the minimum sufficientE1
*
requirement is a university degree (i.e., R=2), because qualifications are discrete and must meet or
exceed the education level that is necessary to perform the job.  Nonetheless, the discrete jump in




significant portion of the benefit to a qualification, like a university degree, is a signal of innate
unobservable attributes.  Thus, if workers can provide the signal through some other means, such
as work experience and/or successfully completing on-the-job training, they would be qualified to
move up the job hierarchy.2
Suppose Worker A has an A-level (i.e., QA=1) plus one year of college, which meets the
necessary education level to match with Firm X orY.  In Firm X, Worker A earns W0 in the first
period and is exactly educated because an A-level meets the requirements (i.e, QA=R=1).  In the
second period, Worker A moves into job 2 and earns W2 and is undereducated (i.e., QA<R=2). 
Alternatively, in Firm Y, Worker A earns W1 in both periods and is exactly educated because a
secondary degree is sufficient (i.e, Q=R=1).  In equilibrium, Worker A must be indifferent
between the two jobs such that 2W1=W0+W2, abstracting from discounting and period length
differences.  Nonetheless, Worker A earns less than an exactly-educated type B Worker who has a
university degree (i.e., Q=R=2), who earns W3 in the second period.
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This process yields the same wage-education pattern observed in Sicherman (1991) for
undereducated workers.  Specifically, in period 2, Worker A earns more in the undereducated
match of Firm X (i.e., QA<R=2) than in the exactly-educated match of Firm Y  (i.e., QA =R=1) so
that W2>W1.  Worker A also earns less than an exactly-educated Worker B who is matched in a
job with the same requirements (i.e., QB=R=2) so that W2<W3.  Thus, workers and firms match
on the basis of a common E*.  Nonetheless, experienced workers can appear undereducated
because  the on-the-job experience early in a career  “substitutes” for the educational signal and
permits them to move up the job ladder into a position where they have the necessary skills to
properly perform the job, but do not meet the discrete qualification level required of  “typical”
workers.
Again, the wage differential between Worker A and Worker B, W3-W0, can be divided into
two components.  First, comparing the same worker in an exactly-educated versus an
undereducated match (i.e., Worker A n versus ), the firm in the undereducated match hasp X
1 p X
2
higher requirements than would be predicted given that it hires workers with an A-level, . R E> 1
*
The firm pays a return for a job with excess requirements, W2-W0.  Note,
however, Worker A could also work for Firm Y, which pays more in the first period but less in the
second period than Firm X.  Thus, Worker A trades off an initially low rate of return to education
for a subsequent promotion return.  
Second, comparing an exactly-educated worker to an undereducated worker in the same
job (i.e., Worker A versus B on ), an undereducated worker has lower qualifications thanp X
2
would be predicted for a typical worker in a job that require a university degree, . Q E< 2
*
Worker A earns less than Worker B, W3-W2, reflecting the marginal return to additional
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educational qualifications on a given job.  In summary, an undereducated worker is more likely to
work for a firm that has R>E* relative to comparably-educated, exactly-educated workers and
more likely to have Q<E* relative to comparably-placed, exactly-educated workers.
C. Predictions
The theoretical model yields three predictions.  First, a worker in an overeducated type of
match is predicted to have Q>E* and R<E*, and a worker in an undereducated type of match is
predicted to have Q<E* and R>E*.  The ordered probit models in 2.1-2.3 for the qualification
choice of workers and 4.1-4.3 for the requirement choice of firms permit a comparison between
the observed Q or R and the predicted E* independent of the observed match.  However, because
matching process is predicted to jointly determine Q and R, the ordered probit models are
estimated simultaneously and include a parameter for the correlation of Q and R.  The j int
ordered probit estimates are used to predict whether Q  E* controlling for the R-type of the firm><
(i.e., a movement along an iso-profit  curve), and to predict whether R  E* controlling for the><
Q-type of the individual (i.e., a movement between iso-profit curves for the same person).  The
predicted match types from the  model are tested by comparing the differences between Q and E*
and R and E*  for workers who are observed to be overeducated, undereducated, or exactly-
educated.
Second, the model predicts that both overeducated and undereducated workers may be
more likely to receive training and move up the job hierarchy than exactly-educated workers who
are comparably-placed and educated.  Thus, two probit models are estimated for the probability
of receiving training and earning a promotion, including controls for workers who are predicted to
be in an overeducated- and undereducated-type match from the ordered probit model.  
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Finally, the model predicts that workers in an overeducated and undereducated type of
match trade off a lower rate of return to education for a subsequent promotion return.  Thus, the
wage profile is expected to be relatively steep for workers in overeducated and undereducated
types of matches.  This hypothesis is tested by estimating several wage regressions that include
controls for workers who are predicted by the ordered probit model to be in an overeducated- and
undereducated-type match, and the interactions of these controls with years of education.
IV. The Data and Derivation of the Match Variables
A. The Data Source
The data source for the empirical analysis is the Social Change and Economic Life
Initiative (SCELI) that surveyed 6,110 people in roughly equal numbers from six different labour
markets - Aberdeen, Coventry, Kirkcaldy, Northampton, Rochdale and Swindon. These data are
unique in their detail of the individual, job, and firm attributes, which are necessary to conduct the
empirical analysis.  These data were collected in June and July of 1986, using stratified random
sampling to obtain a respondent sample representative of British working-age adults. The sample
includes wage and salary workers and people who are self-employed, unemployed, or out of the
labour force.  
The analysis uses a subset of these data that includes 1556 observations for male, wage
and salary workers who report all relevant information.  Women are excluded to make our
analysis comparable to prior work on overeducation (e.g., Cohn and Khan, 1995; Sicherman,
1991; Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989). The self-employed are excluded because SCELI includes
only limited information regarding firm and job attributes for these workers.  Persons who are
3A high qualification includes a Higher National Certificate (Diploma), a University
Diploma, a Nursing and Teaching Qualification, and other professional, university or CNAA
degree.  A medium qualification includes a General or Scottish Certificate of Education (i.e., an
A-level or Higher), a Certificate of Sixth Year Studies, City and Guilds, Ordinary National
Certificate (Diploma), a Scottish Vocational training degree, a Clerical and Commercial or Trade
apprenticeship.  A low-skill qualification includes all other qualifications.
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unemployed or out of the labour force are excluded for the obvious reason that a person must be
employed in order for us to observe differences between Q and R. 
B. The Ordered Probit Specification
  The data are first used to estimate the ordered-probit models.  The actual and required
qualifications (Q and R) are delineated as low, medium, and, high with a numerical ordering of 0
through 2.  Highly qualified workers obtain an advanced degree (i.e., a degree or diploma from a
university or college), medium-qualified workers obtain either an A-level, apprenticeship, or
equivalent qualification, whereas the low-qualified workers obtain none of these qualifications.3  
These categories are sufficiently narrow to ensure differences among the qualification levels (i.e.,
2>1>0), and are sufficiently broad to ensure that workers within a given category have similar
qualifications (e.g., nurses and teachers are similarly educated).   
Following the empirical model, the ordered-probit specification for Q ncludes family
attributes that measure access to financial and human capital, and attitudinal/first-job attributes
that measure labour-market commitment and opportunities, and the ordered-probit specification
for R includes measures of firm, job, and labour market attributes.  For brevity, the means of the
explanatory variables used in the ordered-probit models for Q an  R are included in Appendix
17
Tables 1 and 2, respectively, for categories 0-2 and for the match types Q>R, Q=R, and Q<R. 
However, consistent with the theoretical models prediction, the descriptive statistics do indicate
that overeducated workers tend to be younger and undereducated workers older than their exactly
educated counterparts. 
C. The Predicted Match Type
Maximum-likelihood estimates of the joint ordered-probit models for Q and R are
presented in Table 1.  The estimated correlation coefficient between the errors for Q and R is
0.573 and significantly different from zero, which supports the contention that Q and R should be
estimated simultaneously.  The correlation coefficient is also significantly different from one,
which indicates that the match of actual and required qualifications, although correlated, is far
from exact.  The coefficients on the explanatory variables are generally significant and suggest
that family background and labour-market opportunities affect the choice of actual qualifications
whereas firm and job attributes affect required qualifications.  
The tests of the model hinge on correctly predicting the type of match.  Thus, the
discussion focuses on whether overeducated workers are predicted to have Q>E* and R<E*  and
whether undereducated workers are predicted to have Q<E* and R>E*  by the ordered probit
model. Table 2 presents a comparison between E*, hich is defined as the educational category
that has the maximum joint probability from the ordered-probit models, and the observed values
of Q and R  for workers who are observed to be overeducated (Q>R), exactly-educated (Q=R),
and undereducated (Q<R).  The bold cells in Table 2 indicate that 89 percent of the 303
overeducated workers are predicted to have Q>E* (i.e., row 3) or R<E* (i.e., column 1). 
Similarly, 89 percent of the 207 undereducated workers are predicted to have Q<E* (i.e., row 1)
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or R>E* (i.e., column 3).  Moreover, whereas the majority of exactly-educated workers place in
the centre cell where Q=R=E*, 46 percent of workers are predicted to be in the surrounding cells
that may not expected to be in an exactly-educated match through-out their career.  Thus, the
results in Table 2 broadly support the predictions of the theoretical model regarding the
relationship between the predicted education level and the actual qualifications and requirements.
For simplicity, four dummy variables are used to identify the type of match in the probit
and wage specifications.  Specifically, an overeducated-type match is defined by two binary
variables that equal one if the observed qualification exceeds the predicted qualification, Q>E*, or
if the observed requirement is less than the predicted requirement, R<E*.   Si ilarly, an
undereducated-type match is also defined by two binary variables that equal one if the observed
qualification is less than the predicted qualification, Q<E*, and if the observed requirement is
exceeds the predicted requirement, R>E*.  Thus, the excluded categories are Q=E* and R=E*,
which are predicted for an exactly-educated type of match.  
The use of two dummy variables for each match type permit a distinction between
predicted movements along and between iso-profit curves.  Moreover, for exactly-educated
workers, the dummy variables can potentially separate those workers who are expected to be
exactly-educated through out their career from those who are predicted to be overeducated and
undereducated at some point in their career.  Although the identification of the match type is not
likely to be exact, the coefficients on the dummy variables in the probit and wage models would
4The empirical model is also estimated identifying an overeducated type of match as
workers who are observed to be overeducated or those who are exactly educated but have Q>E*
and R<E*, and the undereducated type of match as workers who are observed to be
undereducated or those who are exactly educated but have Q<E* and R>E*.  The results for the
match variables from the probit and wage models are qualitatively equivalent to those presented,
but are generally less significant. This result may suggest that those workers who are
overeducated or undereducated but are not predicted to be are truly mismatched.
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not be expected to support the predictions of the theoretical model to the extent they are
imprecise measures of the type of match.4
V. Current Training, Promotion, and Wage Analyses
The dependent variables for training and promotion are defined by two binary variables
that equal one if a worker indicates that he or she received training on the current job or has a
good or excellent chance of promotion.  Weekly earnings are used in the wage model following
prior work that suggests that this measure has less measurement error than hourly earnings and
controls for part-time work unlike annual earnings (e.g., Borjas, 1980).  Following Sicherman
(1991), each specification includes a vector of standard worker attributes used as explanatory
variables in a Mincer-earnings equation.  Our analysis differs from prior work by including four
binary variables that measure the type of match. 
The probit results for training and promotion prospects in the current job are provided in
Table 3.  A likelihood-ratio test between the specifications that do and do not distinguish by the
type of educational match (i.e., columns 1 vs. 2 and columns 3 vs. 4) yields a value of 17.52 in the
training equation and 11.8 in the promotion equation, which are significant at the 5 and 10 
5The probit and wage models are identified both by exclusion restrictions and through the
nonlinearity of the first-stage ordered-probit model. To test the possible sensitivity of the results
to overidentifying restrictions in the probit and wage models, each specification is reestimated
including all the explanatory variables in the ordered-probit model and relying on nonlinearity for
identification.  In each case, the sign and significance of the coefficients on the match variables do
not change.  Thus, the results are robust to changes in the identifying restrictions.
6Sloane et al (1999) find that overeducated workers are more likely to leave their current
firms, while the undereducated are more likely to stay with their current firms. This would be the
expected result if the training in an overeducated type match is general, whereas the signal in an
undereducated type match is firm specific.
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percent level, respectively.  Overall, the sign and magnitude of the coefficients on the match
variables support the contention that the training and promotion opportunities vary with the type
of educational match.  For brevity, the empirical discussion focuses on educational match issues.5
The coefficients on match variables are positive in the probit model for current training, 
but only the coefficients on the qualification and requirement differences for an overeducated type
of match are significant at traditional levels.  Thus, workers that select an overeducated-type of
match and the firms that hire them are more likely to be engaged in training than their exactly-
educated counterparts, whereas those workers and firms in an undereducated type match are not. 
This result may indicate that the promotion process for overeducated-type jobs reflects the
acquisition of on-the-job training, but that the promotion process for undereducated-type jobs
may arise more from a worker signalling to the firm that he or she has an aptitude for the job.6 
The coefficients on the requirement differences in an overeducated- and undereducated-type
7Wage specifications that include quadratic terms for education and experience are also
estimated and yield the same qualitative conclusions as those presented.  Thus, we focus on the
most parsimonious of specifications for ease of presentation.
8The number of observations is smaller in the wage equations than in the ordered probit
model because some workers do not report their wage.  However, the mean Q and R of workers
who do and do not report their wage does not significantly differ and, thus, is not expected to bias
the results in a particular direction.
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match are also significantly positive in the probit model of promotion, which supports the
prediction of the theoretical model that the promotion opportunities are better in an overeducated
and undereducated-type of match.
Three specifications of the wage equation are provided in Table 4.7  A standard earning
equation is included in column 1 and provides a source of comparison for Model 2 that includes
the match variables.  An F-statistic comparing Models 1 and 2 equals 7.5, which is significant at
the 1 percent level. The specification in Model 3 examines possible interaction effects between the
educational match variables and the level of education.  The F-statistic comparing the
specifications in Models 2 and 3 is 6.60, which is also significant at the 1 percent level.  Thus, the
interaction effect appears to be important for wages.  
In general, the sign and significance of the coefficients support the predictions of the
theoretical model.8  In Model 2, the coefficient on the qualification differences are positive and
significant for both the overeducated- and undereducated-type match.  This finding is consistent
with the prediction of the theoretical model that changes in qualifications along the iso-profit
curve yield higher wages.  In addition, the coefficient on the requirement differences is
9The coefficients in the wage equations, although different from those found using U.S.
data sources, are typical of those found using U.K. data sources with the exception of a relatively
low return to education.  Our return to education estimates are not directly comparable to most
U.K. studies that calculate the return using qualification dummies and not years of education.
However, Polacheck and Siebert (1993) use data on men and women drawn from the 1972
General Household Survey of the U.K. to estimate a wage specification including the number of
years of education and find a rate of return equal to 6.2 percent.  We replicate their specification
using men and women in SCELI (not presented), which also yields a return to education of 6.2
percent.  Thus, the results are unlikely to be due to some unique attributes of the SCELI data.
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insignificant for the overeducated-type match, but positive and significant for the undereducated
match type.  The theoretical model predicts the sign of the coefficients on the requirement
differences are indeterminate, because overeducated- and undereducated-type workers are
expected to trade off a low initial return to education for a subsequent promotion return.   In the
interactive specification in Model 3, the coefficient on the requirement differences are positive and
significant, whereas its interaction with years of education in negative and significant. Thus, the
results confirm the predicted tradeoff between the schooling and promotion return for workers in
an overeducated- and undereducated-type match.9
VI. Concluding Remarks
Prior evidence from the U.S. and Europe indicates that the educational qualifications of a
third or more of the work force either exceed or fall short of the employer-specified education
requirements for the job.  This paper theoretically models and empirically tests the hypothesis that
overeducation and undereducation arise out of a common equilibrium matching process whereby
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workers choose a discrete qualification level to maximise lifetime income and firms set a discrete
qualification requirement to maximise profits.  The theoretical model predicts that the
overeducated begin in low-paying, entry-level jobs early in their career that train them for higher-
paying future positions that require their educational background.  Likewise, the undereducated
start in low-paying, exactly-educated jobs that, in time, can signal the worker has the necessary 
skills for promotion.  Thus, our model suggests that prior work that identifies and compares the
economic aspects of overeducation or undereducation relative to the exactly educated in a cross-
section or a short panel may be misleading, because all workers are likely to be exactly-educated
during some portion of their career.
The predictions of the theoretical model are tested by several related empirical analyses
that use a sample of British working-age males from the Social Change and Economic Life
Initiative (SCELI) data.  The discrete-hedonic-matching model provides the basis for a joint
ordered-probit model of worker qualifications and firm requirements.  The results confirm the
prediction of the theoretical model that the type of educational match relates to differences
between the predicted and observed qualifications of the worker and the predicted and observed
requirements of the firm. These differences are used to identify the type of educational match in
probit models for on-the-job training and promotion and in several wage equations. The results
show that traditional wage equations can understate the return to education because workers in an
overeducated- and undereducated-type match trade off a lower return to education for future
wage gains from promotion.
Overall, the theoretical model provides the first holistic approach to the matching process
between workers are firms that can lead to overeducation or undereducation and extends the
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equilibrium interpretation of overeducation in Sicherman and Gabor (1990) to undereducation. 
The empirical work support the contention that workers and firms can benefit from a match where
worker qualifications do not equal firm requirements.  Thus, the paper show that, although
workers and firms may not always be appropriately matched, the degree of mismatch in the labour
market is likely to be smaller than the 30 to 50 percent of workers who are overeducated or
undereducated at any point in time in the labour market. 
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Table 1  Bivariate Ordinal Probit Results







Mother Out of Work -0.202 -3.466 Professional 1.244 10.806
Mother White Collar 0.179 0.739 Non Manual 1.045 9.517
Mother Self Employed -0.242 -0.899 Skilled Manual 0.514 5.06
Father Out of Work -0.163 -1.797 Employees>500 0.206 3.083
Father White Collar 0.415 4.554 Insider is Important -0.056 -0.769
Father Self Employed 0.124 1.292 Union -0.099 -1.601
Age -0.006 -2.222 Requirements Nec. 0.767 11.702
Married at Age 20 -0.259 -2.995 Time to Proficiency 0.15 6.151
Kids at Age 20 -1.422 -2.815 Years of Training 0.062 2.538
Work Natural -0.298 -2.797 Good Promotion Prspt. 0.078 1.204
Work if Rich 0.084 1.47 Sprvis. Effects Wrk. -0.073 -1.119
Men are Prm. Earner 0.363 5.194  Reorg. in Last 5 Yrs. 0.148 2.47
Men’s Jobs Come First 0.22 3.305 Part-Time Job -0.223 -0.793
Public Sector Job 0.279 4.172 Log of Hours Worked -0.21 -1.319
Hours Worked: 35-40 -0.223 -1.962 Unemployment Rate 0.009 1.202
Hours Worked: >40 -0.278 -2.358 - - -
Supervisory Resp. 0.495 3.481 - - -
Cowrks. Mainly Men -0.036 -0.593 - - -
Good Promotion Prspt. 0.18 3.282 - - -
Central Englanda -0.168 -2.128 - - -
Northern England -0.009 -0.104 - - -
Urban Scotland 0.011 0.141 - - -
Rural Scotland 0.672 2.019 - - -
Other Countries 0.014 0.074 - - -
Constant 0.537 3.128 Constant -0.705 -1.144
µ2 1.01 26.361 µ1 1.002 22.295
Number of observations = 1556
Log-likelihood = -2614.97
Estimated correlation (ñ) = 0.573, standard error = 0.030
Table 2   Predicted and Observed Qualifications and Requirements
Overeducated: Q>R (Number of Observations=303)
R<E* R=E* R>E* Total
Q<E* 5.61 0.33 0.00 5.94
Q=E* 10.23 10.23 0.00 20.46
Q>E* 3.30 63.04 7.26 73.60
Total 19.14 73.60 7.26 100.00
Exactly Educated: Q=R (Number of Observations = 1046)
R<E* R=E* R>E* Total
Q<E* 6.69 7.84 0.00 14.53
Q=E* 2.39 53.73 2.10 58.22
Q>E* 0.00 6.21 21.03 27.24
Total 9.08 67.78 23.13 100.00
Undereducated: Q<R  (Number of Observations=207)
R<E* R=E* R>E* Total
Q<E* 8.21 16.43 3.38 28.02
Q=E* 0.48 10.63 43.96 55.07
Q>E* 0.00 0.00 16.91 16.91
Total 8.69 27.06 64.25 100.00
Table 3  Probit Models for Training and Promotion
Current Training Promotion Prospects


























































































































Log-likelihood  — -976.874 -968.115 -958.179 -952.279
Note. Asymptotic t-values are in parentheses.  All models have 1556 observations.
Table 4  Wage Regressions








































































































2.638 - - -0.023
(-1.756)
R2 0.252 0.268 0.273
Note.  T-values are in parentheses.  All models have 1383 observations.  
Appendix Table 1  Variable Means for Qualifications













Mother Out of Work 0.403 0.285 0.277 0.281 0.341 0.353
Mother White Collar 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.011 0.01
Mother Self Employed 0.009 0.011 0.01 0.013 0.01 0.01
Father Out of Work 0.134 0.094 0.069 0.092 0.111 0.087
Father White Collar 0.057 0.091 0.221 0.109 0.114 0.092
Father Self Employed 0.077 0.079 0.117 0.083 0.093 0.072
Work Attitudes
Age 38.87 35.438 36.962 34.716 37.256 40.696
Married at Age 20 0.148 0.125 0.051 0.096 0.118 0.135
Kids at Age 20 0.011 0.004 0 0 0.006 0.014
Work Natural 0.093 0.066 0.038 0.069 0.069 0.077
Work if Rich 0.611 0.668 0.715 0.63 0.67 0.628
Men are Primary Earner 0.158 0.213 0.31 0.261 0.206 0.198
Men’s Jobs Come First 0.18 0.257 0.293 0.188 0.249 0.232
Labour Market Attributes
Public Sector Job 0.156 0.2 0.356 0.205 0.234 0.184
Hours Worked: 35-40 0.463 0.489 0.471 0.508 0.476 0.411
Hours Worked: > 40 0.491 0.457 0.407 0.432 0.447 0.551
Supervisory Resp. 0.019 0.03 0.109 0.026 0.054 0.029
Coworkers Mainly Men 0.717 0.747 0.618 0.696 0.703 0.71
Good Promotion Prspt. 0.427 0.485 0.649 0.465 0.507 0.536
Central Englanda 0.294 0.283 0.226 0.238 0.273 0.324
Northern England 0.177 0.183 0.204 0.188 0.193 0.145
Urban Scotland 0.291 0.37 0.252 0.337 0.303 0.29
Rural Scotland 0.005 0.002 0.02 0.017 0.005 0.01
Other Countries 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.023 0.024 0.029
a - the excluded region is Southern England
Appendix Table 2  Variable Means for Requirements













Professional 0.111 0.161 0.501 0.175 0.225 0.295
Non Manual 0.165 0.237 0.389 0.264 0.229 0.266
Skilled Manual 0.358 0.504 0.1 0.307 0.328 0.362
Employees>500 0.261 0.264 0.327 0.244 0.27 0.377
Insider is Important 0.773 0.776 0.81 0.799 0.774 0.807
Union 0.544 0.531 0.476 0.508 0.537 0.473
Job Attributes
Requirements Necessary 0.222 0.768 0.778 0.363 0.518 0.643
Time to Proficiency 0.856 1.802 1.762 1.123 1.315 1.716
Years of Training 0.349 0.896 1.026 0.652 0.608 0.957
Good Promotion Prspt. 0.542 0.62 0.786 0.611 0.614 0.7
Supervision Effects Wrk. 0.259 0.307 0.262 0.287 0.27 0.261
Job Reorg. in Last 5 Yrs. 0.409 0.401 0.529 0.419 0.424 0.531
Part-Time Job 0.021 0.013 0.017 0.02 0.018 0.014
Log of Hours Worked 3.67 3.662 3.642 3.671 3.655 3.673
Labour Market Attributes
Unemployment Rate 13.267 13.523 12.753 12.905 13.266 13.295
